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➲ Global Times once Again:
Representative Democracy
and Countervailing Trends in Iberoamerica

Abstract: In the late 1990s and early 2000s democratic expectations were replaced by the discredit of democracy. Analyzing this trend, this study looks at the interplay of politics and the economic realm. It discusses the fragility and persistence of democracy and identifies the effect of recent macro-economic policies, the weakening of public goods, processes of dualization in forms of participation in the public domain. It also analyzes contrasting political trends, which involve some innovative projects institutionalizing democratic controls, but also new forms of populism and clientelism buttressed by poverty, unemployment and violence which reinforce the logic of exclusion. Finally, it suggests rethinking the public realm as a focus for the re-creation of sociability and a shared sense of future by improving public performance and efficacy, safeguarding public goods and thus promoting democratic sustainability in Iberoamerica.

Keywords: Comparative Politics; Democratic Fragility; Contemporary Trends; Iberoamerica; 20th-21st Century.

Only two decades ago most Iberoamerican countries embraced democracy and neoliberalism enthusiastically. After suffering long periods of authoritarianism, military takeovers and state repression, these societies emerged as fervent supporters of the democratic credo in the changed global environment of the post-cold war. There is nothing surprising perhaps in the enthusiastic adoption of democracy in the 1980s and early 1990s. As a result of the global immersion of the region and its self representation and reflexivity, these societies are discursively and institutionally biased toward the modern (Roniger/Waisman 2002).¹ Thus once again in the late twentieth century, the political

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¹ Reasons of space preclude developing fully the claim that this is part of a long-term trend of global insertion and connection which shaped a forward-looking emphasis on progress and development; and which generated its own countervailing forces, again related to trends and ideas at the forefront of Western multiple modernities. On this see the contributions in Roniger/Waisman (2002), especially the works by Whitehead, Eisenstadt and Roniger.
and social elites in these societies turned to fashionable external ideas to pick up those models that would lead their countries towards global integration and sustainable growth. The credibility of the external models was buttressed through:

- their appeal to the bright and ambitious;
- their high academic and public prestige, especially in the centers of power and learning in the West;
- their promise of inclusion;
- the weak resistance of étatism and nationalism, no longer seen as hegemonic;
- and last, but most important, the trend away from collective concerns due to the legacy of human-right violations, at least in countries such as those of the Southern Cone.

In this framework representative democracy was heralded as the harbinger of a new age, to differ from previous waves of democratization, as it resulted from the growing role of social movements and civil society, which were instrumental both in dismantling dictatorial rule and replacing earlier strong étatist trends. Political liberalization was to be combined with policies of structural adjustment, transformation and liberalization in the economic realm, buttressed by the supposed retreat of the states from their former control of the economic domain.

By the late 1990s and early 2000s, both representative democracy and the new macro-economic policies had been discredited. And while in the global arena the West wrangled with forces spearheaded by religious radicalism and terrorism, adding to the lack of a regulated global order, in Iberoamerica the heralded triumph of democracy and ‘neo-liberalism’ led way to an erosion of institutional trust and disenchantment, which revealed the resilience of old-new forms of politics, along with various innovative initiatives designed to cope with the malfunctions that characterized the shift to neo-liberal or neo-conservative macroeconomic policies.

In this article I would like to reflect on the significance of these contemporary trends in one of the regions in which, contrastingly to the Islamic or Chinese societies, the confrontation with Western modernity took the form of countervailing currents derived from within the hegemonic ideas and institutions themselves, that is, in terms of the latter’s own malfunctions and disillusions. Thus this confrontation turned out to be one between multiple forms of modernity, challenging one another in terms of their unfulfilled visions and global iconic standing.

We witness the reaction to global capitalism in Iberoamerica and elsewhere. Alongside libertarian, anarchist and anti-globalization movements, such as those seen in Seattle or Genoa, these forces are opposing the capitalist logic of neo-liberal and neo-conservative macro-economic policies. Like their revolutionary syndicalist predecessors a century ago, these social forces favor direct action, self-management, federalism, mutual aid and internationalism, linking it to old-new themes of justice, social ecology, individual and collective autonomy and human solidarity (see for instance the international libertarian declaration of Madrid in March-April 2001).

In the region, new macroeconomic policies have generated an anti-‘global’ protest, especially through their impact on indigenous and rural communities and property relations. In some cases, the reforms have effectively undermined rural property. Thus, in
addition to the trend sparked in Porto Alegre, there is also the vein stemming from Chiapas, which adds the grievances of the indigenous and peasant populations to those policies perceived to be threatening rural lifestyles. Whatever the specific case, neo-liberalism has been identified with the state and this has enabled movements such as the Zapatistas in Chiapas or the Movimento Sem Terra in Brazil to target the state nationally and internationally, globalizing on a symbolic and organizational level their claims to land and to recognition of their cultural identity.

Paradoxically, as a result of these struggles, state institutions have remained the locus of political articulation and interaction. These movements of protest reject, or at least express a sense of uneasiness with policies which reinforce exclusion, huge socio-economic gaps and marginalization. The open protest is but the tip of an iceberg of large social strata wrangling to understand the failure to achieve the dreams heralded by recent market openings.

Democratic hopes and expectations spread to the entire region in the quarter of century following the Ecuadorian and Dominican elections of 1978 (Alcántara 2003). And yet while democracy has become the “only game in town,” we should still ask in what forms and through which dynamics and mechanisms it has been installed. The trends are contradictory. They involve some innovative initiatives institutionalizing democratic controls on a local level, but also various forms of neo-populism and neo-clientelism which are worth examining in some detail.

Disenchantment and loss of public trust

The first aspect of public opinion we can identify is a decrease in public trust, as reflected in surveys of public opinion. Despite an awareness of the limitations of opinion polls, we should still recognize that they reflect trends and changes, especially when compiled over relatively long periods and where they follow coherent criteria for data collection. From the surveys published by Latinobarómetro for the year 2002, it appears that even though most of the citizens interviewed supported democracy, preferring it to other forms of government, the rates of support had decreased since 1996 in 13 out of 17 countries covered by the survey, with 5 nations showing a very low percentage, in the range of 37 to 45 percent. Colombia, Brazil, El Salvador, Paraguay and Guatemala were in this range of the scale in 2002.2

The level of support for authoritarianism increased in 8 countries between the years 1996 and 2002. A persistent increase in the popular demand for hard line policies against criminals and marginal elements was also traced, even in countries in which the population was strongly in favor of democracy after long periods of authoritarian and military governments, such as the Southern Cone countries. Also, in 11 out of 17 countries the level of dissatisfaction and disenchantment with the functioning of the democratic system exceeded the 50 percent of those surveyed between 1996 and 2002.

These figures indicate a significant lack of confidence in the system, despite its formal acceptance. Paraguay and Argentina are extreme cases, with a dissatisfaction rate of

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over 90 percent in 2002. Mexico was another case of great discontent with democracy: over 80 percent in a country which started a process of transference of government after a decades-long period of single-party rule, corporatism and clientelist politics. In Colombia, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, disenchantment with the system was around 60 to 80 percent of the representative samples. As for economic policies, public opinion tended also to tilt towards a negative evaluation of their performance.

What are the implications of such disenchantment with democracy? It may be assessed as an expression of failing democratic consolidation. But it may also reflect a trend found elsewhere in mature democracies, which by definition are pluralistic and open to criticism and civilian control. In order to evaluate the significance of these trends, it may be useful to take two parallel lines of analysis: one comparative and the other, across time.

Taking the comparative lead, it is necessary to keep in mind that in the postwar democracies of the so called “trilateral” countries – the USA, Europe and Japan – there has been a constant concern with the ‘crises of democracy’ from at least the 1970s. Diverse indicators reflected a deep disappointment with representative democracy, as shown already in the germinal report of Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki (1975). More recent work on the deterioration of public trust by Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam (2000) indicates that this is more than an ephemeral trend in these democracies.

Coming back to Iberoamerica, this lead may suggest that the critical attitude of the population may indeed be related to the fact that these democracies managed to become established. Indeed, at least in terms of the formal criteria advanced by Robert Dahl or Adam Przeworski, the longevity of democracies in the region stands out. And yet their citizens express low levels of public trust towards politicians and the ruling class. So perhaps public distrust is not necessarily a sign of institutional immaturity (See also Uslaner 2003; Newton/Norris 2000).

While we can contextualize the current disappointment expressed toward democracy by taking into account high expectations in the 1980s and 1990s, we should assess whether representative democracy is sustainable in a context of widespread disenchantment, loss of confidence in institutions, the failure of democratic culture to reach all levels of society, and a cynical approach toward the supposedly public commitment of political elites? I would like to claim that it is precisely now, when representative democracy has become “the only game in town”, that coups d’état are launched in the name of democracy and to deepen democracy, and when various forces aim to criticize democracy in terms of its own rationality and unfulfilled vision, that we should approach institutional fragility analytically.

**Institutional fragility and democratic persistence**

As emphasized in the literature, every democracy is fragile (Bobbio 1987; Eisenstadt 1998, 1999). The Iberoamerican systems were especially fragile during the Cold War, and particularly in the 1970s, when they collapsed under the pressure of mounting mass mobilizations, guerrilla and paramilitary groups, and military takeovers. We should recognize that such fragility has been reenacted following the restoration of democracy during the current wave of democratization and in spite of an internationally propitious
framework. To mention just three cases, at the end of the twenty-first century the Argentinean political system was about to sink in the midst of economic disarray; Venezuela entered into a process of acute polarization and economic crisis, losing its political stability; and in Colombia high rates of violence were a blemish which over-determined the problematic operation of democracy.

We tend to think of fragility as leading to breakdown. But in the context of these societies, we witness both institutional fragility and the persistence of democracy. One could focus on Colombia, for example. The country continues to be ridden by violence and pressures derived from the presence of guerrillas, paramilitary forces, drug traffickers, state repression and criminal and social violence. According to local observers, the patterns and traditions of violence are recorded “by fire” in the flesh and memory of generations of Colombians (Jimeno 1998). And yet the political system has stood by democracy and great parts of its elites have shown a strong political will, trying to elaborate institutional mechanisms designated to improve the democratic capabilities of the polity and public administration.

In the Southern Cone, Brazil and Guatemala, the return to representative democracy corresponds with a few paradoxes in those countries pulling out of previous authoritarian rule. In these cases it is precisely under democracy that people have raised questions and expressed their doubts concerning the representative character of their political system. It is also under democracy that criminal and social violence – and in the case of Guatemala in the 1980s also state violence – increased, following closely the liberalization of the public sphere. No wonder that many citizens have doubted whether institutional channels were functioning effectively, and whether they were wide enough, limited or perhaps too wide with regard to their earlier expectations.

The solution, of course, is neither a return to past authoritarian rule nor the curtailment of civil rights and free public spheres. However, there is no doubt that due to the conditions generated under democracy considerable sectors of the population expect the security forces to act severely against elements thought to be threatening the social order, be they criminals or marginal individuals. While this demand for harsh measures follows its own logic within the context of social deterioration and economic decline, it constitutes a problem as far as civil and political rights are concerned, even if the current democracies have professed to condemn the use of repression as carried out by the previous de facto governments.

Pooling these cases together, violence emerges as a central concern in terms of institutional fragility and viability. Whether related to the political system as in Colombia, where violence crystallized very early on fuelled by party identities, or in countries such as Brazil, where social and criminal violence mounted in relative disconnection from the political system, violence generates a process of amalgamation of identities. Violence cuts off the ties of shared identity between strangers, while replacing them with the illusion of finding security and stability through the construction of an image of the other as an enemy. This process of reconstruction of identity predicates exclusion and the adjournment of dialogue (Bowman 2001; Feitlowitz 1998; Roniger 2005). In Iberoamerica such seclusion takes places primarily along class lines and secondarily along ethnic identity. It may trigger a dynamics of “ghettoization” of identities, to use Ralf Dahrendorf’s term (2003) or of spatial segregation as typical of the mega-cities but also found in rural areas, especially in countries of continental dimensions and regional seclusion such as Colombia (Rojas de Ferro 1998).
As violence persists, it has crucial implications for the institutional viability of democracy. When segregation occurs and a restrictive sense of identity is forged, individuals cling to distrust and exclusion of members of other classes, social groups or ethnicities. This is even more pronounced if it occurs together with a deterioration of traditional norms and forms of reciprocity and its replacement with high residential mobility, the weakening of ties of locality and connections, regarding authority as arbitrary and the public sphere with suspicion.3

Personal security is a public good. The issue of protecting public goods – maintaining their quality, or at least compensating for their faults – is transformed into a central problem that affects the political and social agenda (Roniger 2002). In some of the metropolitan areas of the region, such as Caracas, Rio or the great Buenos Aires area, the issue of public security has acquired alarming facets. Although evident for decades, growing social gaps have deepened the problem, especially as parts of the middle class and the lower-middle class, have suffered downward mobility. As a result of loss of governance, loss of sociability, loss of normativity, growing violence, mendacity and the expansion of the informal sector, some of these cities have become battlefields of crime and survival (Rotker 2002). The line between victims of structural marginality and victimizers is often blurred under such conditions (Mockus/Corzo 2003). This is connected to social complexity and above all to the images of uncertainty and despair. Supposedly the more complex a society is, the higher the levels of uncertainty and risk, as analyzed by Ulrich Beck (1992) and Zigmunt Bauman (2000) among others. Iberoamerican societies are highly stratified and individuals are markedly separated by class and life style. This, combined with rising expectations of participation, turns sociability into a problematic area through which the willingness of citizens to see themselves as part of society is assessed. It exacerbates a general trend by which, whenever the codes of sociability are disrespected, every interaction carries the risk of turning violent. Consequently, urban space has fractured and become ‘privatized’, with social groups refraining from entering the neighborhoods of other sectors and classes. Urban deterioration has followed and distrust has become widespread in some of these cities (Espinosa 2003: 1-2).

Under these conditions, there is a rising demand for harsh punitive short-term measures rather than structural long-term solutions, as if personal security could be secured through harsher terms of retaliation against criminals. Respect for human rights seems particularly problematic in this framework of such highly divided and fractured settings. Due to such pressures and expectations, these democracies have not yet found a way of combining the demand for personal and public security with respect for human rights (Roniger/Sznajder 1999).

The ‘solution’ becomes a problem when the ethics of impunity are projected onto the rank-and-file of the public security forces. In cases such as sectors of the Argentinean and Mexican police, this leads to abuse, extortion of bribes and extra-legal payments, illegal use of police powers and an “easy trigger” tendency, violating civil rights as much as the application of the law. The methods adopted by the forces of order under civil gov-

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3 In the last decade, parallel processes have contributed to a fragmentary point of view, among them a decline in old political commitments and the weakening of trade unions (Clark/Lipset/Rempel 1993; Birle 1999).
ernments have contributed to the widespread distrust with which they are perceived by large sectors of the population of these countries, the same groups who on a declarative level support harsher punishments to increase their sense of personal security.

One could claim that control of product quality can be entrusted to market self-regulation, but in the case of control of violence and institutional guarantees for personal security, the operative balance of institutions has an immediate effect on the image of institutional capability, with consequences for the capacity to attract investments and the maintenance of a "powerful" population within the country.

On the first plane, we find that none of the Iberoamerican countries – with the exception of Chile – have made it into the ranks of the first twenty countries in the "Global Competitiveness Reports" published by the World Economic Forum. A major factor in this has been their image of institutional fragility. The lack of institutional guarantees has another, perhaps no less crucial impact: it leads influential elements to opt out, to leave the country of origin. Since the nineteenth century two basic forms of escape have crystallized. One is the exile of members of the political opposition, magnified in the twentieth century by the mass phenomenon of refugees. The second form is the escape of professionals, intellectuals and individuals from all social classes, driven by their lack of confidence in the future of their country of origin. Under democracy, about 500,000 individuals have departed from Iberoamerica yearly to settle in other countries. Between the years 2000 and 2003 a million and a half people emigrated from Ecuador. Almost two million left Brazil, and about 600,000 left Peru. As many as 160,000 emigrated annually from Argentina, and approximately 1,360,000 people left Colombia, between 1996 and 2001. Even if it is impossible to discern the multiple reasons why millions of inhabitants have left Iberoamerican countries and live abroad at any given time, this phenomenon reflects, most likely, the loss of vitality of these nations, which instead of being a focus of attraction, are becoming, at least in the short and intermediate term, centers of expulsion of part of their own population. The fundamental problem has its roots in institutional fragility, which brings us to rethink the basic boundaries and the operative dilemmas of democracy, analyzing them beyond the formal plane.

The key issue in this respect is whether democratic institutions can thrive by becoming the vectors of a sense of a community and polity committed to collective life and public goods rather than entering into a spiral of recurrent fear, suspicion and violence.

**Institutional performance and public goods**

This sense of belonging, which affects institutions and participation, has been increasingly affected by the new modes of articulation between the political-administrative sphere and the markets of goods and services, particularly the ones considered to be public services.

Individuals evaluate institutions by their performance, i.e. by their actions, efficacy, style, and more than anything else by their concrete product. The quality of the air we breathe and the state of personal security in the public realm are examples of generalized goods that we cherish and that affect our perception of institutional efficacy. Due to their generalized character, once in existence they cannot be denied to those entitled to them, and once they have deteriorated, no one can escape from their corroding effects, regard-
less of the contributions individuals have made towards financing their production (Hirschman 1970: 101). These are complemented by other goods acquired through the markets or consumed in the private sphere which require public intervention in the form of regulation or the setting of non-market criteria for their differential provision to various groups or individuals. Examples can be found in areas such as education, healthcare quality, electricity and water consumption.

Ever since the crisis of the developmentalist capitalist model related to the protectionist and/or populist state, the Latin-American countries have endorsed to different degrees neo-liberal capitalist models. Although we are used to thinking that the shift was enacted due to the “international demonstration effect” of the policies of Thatcher and Reagan and the pressure brought to bear by those organizations connected to the so-called Washington consensus, we should keep in mind that in Iberoamerica this was preceded by the implementation of the Plan “Ladrillo” in 1975 by the Pinochet government in Chile (Fontaine Aldunte 1988; Delano/Traslavina 1989).

A profound change has taken place in the collective imaginary regarding the role of the state and its relations with the markets. First, the state is perceived as part of the problem of lack of development and not as part of the solution to the problem. While in fact states continue to perform many roles, by the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, the idea of the withdrawal of the state and the self-regulation of the markets prevails in the social imagination.

This change heralded the possibility of a depoliticization of the economic realm, even though the new view is no less ideological than the former, since it prioritizes the realm of economics almost as a matter of faith, i.e. as part of the projection of a world view that I would define as “market fundamentalism”. This is how, in some countries, particular issues could be addressed as discrete problems and not be politicized immediately, as was the case in the past. The negative side of this trend is that economic decisions can be isolated and delegated to experts and are not perceived as open to public debate. This can imply, as mentioned above, the political difficulty of delineating alternatives and debating them publicly.

This has had various consequences for the provision of public services and goods. Some of these relate to state responsibility and others relate to the changing relationship of the population to the political system and to the public sphere. To a certain degree, whatever occurs in one of these realms affects the others. The idea that the state has left behind the central role it played in the era of protectionism affects, first of all, state responsibility both to guarantee the quality of public goods and to intervene in cases of market failure.

These elements are articulated in the public sphere through the confidence expressed in institutional channels and guarantees for the regulation of services and markets, the possi-

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4 Experiences cannot be reproduced, even in countries with similar institutional dynamics. The local anchoring of change is crucial. In Chile the change of policy was adopted by a highly authoritarian and repressive government. In spite of the social price demanded, Pinochet’s government was able to overcome the crisis of the early 1980s and managed to transfer its institutional model during the transition to democracy. In Argentina, in a formal democratic framework, many of the changes were introduced by presidential decree, against a background of disarticulation of the opposition and the widespread fears of the population about the perils of hyperinflation, as experienced in the late 1980s.

5 Martin Hoppenhayn in interview with Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, Santiago de Chile (2000).
bility of access to public education and healthcare, or the provision of security, running water and pollution control as public goods. In many cases, consumers have been unable to appeal to institutional channels when they encounter widespread problems in their reliance on market mechanisms. In Brazil, the issue of water quality or the interrupted supply of electricity became a major issue in the 1990s. In Argentina in the 1990s, for example, there were numerous incidents of food poisoning and hospitalization, as a consequence of the consumption of unhealthy products. In countries with normative codes and appropriated institutional channels of appeal, like the USA or Western Europe, such incidents would generate judicial prosecution and a demand for monetary compensation. In Iberoamerica, at the most those involved lamented the case, without consequence. Institutional frameworks often failed to sustain the bond of trust between customer and vendor that, once disavowed, could be taken to superior instances for adjudication. If effective protection of consumers existed, the affected party could opt to bring the claim into relief, which would have wider implications in terms of fiduciary trust beyond the specific merits of the case – namely the effect of repairing the damage if the case warranted it and, even more important for the public sphere, an ethics of market responsibility sustained whenever consumers realize their expectations of market fairness have not been disappointed.

Whenever this is not possible, expectations of impunity are consolidated. In important essays, the late Argentinean sociologist Carlos Nino and the Colombian analyst John Sudarsky analyzed the devastating consequences of this for public confidence in both markets and institutions supposedly charged with regulating such cases of malfunction of mercantile and associative transactions (Nino 1992; Sudarsky 1988). The problem is not confined within national borders, but rather has international implications as well. States cannot ignore their duty to guarantee control of the quality of products and services used by their population without running the risk of losing credibility and the capacity of their firms to enter markets abroad.

The impact of the change is even more conspicuous in privatized companies and their provision of what were formerly conceived of as public services. Privatization was intended to confront fiscal problems and external debt, and to gather funds for the public treasury, easing the pressure created by the debt and thus facilitating their refinancing (Ramamurti 1992, Glade 1995: 96-98). Referring to the case of Argentina, Oscar Oszlak observed that “In the first period, privatization enjoyed a high degree of support. The right climate was created, there were talks about all types of corruption in public companies, from people who took bribes for services to the entire system of purchase and supply of companies. Fueled by actual events, the campaign that was initiated in those years met with enormous public consent. Nowadays the surveys show a high level of dissatisfaction among the customers of these services, due to high tariffs, problems in the scope of services. Surveys show more than 50 percent dissatisfaction with the results of privatization”6. Once privatizations were carried out, the gap between their expected benefits for the public and the opaque and sometimes ineffective way in which they were conducted created public discontent.

Every process of privatization touches upon accountability, regulation and policy results. The urgency and manner in which privatizations were sometimes carried out

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implied some serious faults in the subsequent regulation of the functioning and provision of the privatized services. Early privatizations in Argentina were remarkable in this respect, conducted irrespective of procedures and creating what many saw as corruption and scandal extending from top government officials to their associates and families. This also affected the issue of equality and access to services and goods related to the so-called “third generation rights”, e.g. healthcare and education. Peter Knapp and his associates, among others, have indicated the importance of these realms, stating that there is a level of inequality beyond which the ideals of basic equal opportunities, social equality and inclusive community are transformed into a vacuous claim.7

Dealing with these aspects of institutional performance and malfunction is crucial for public trust, as it is central to public perception of the effective functioning of institutions and the formation of a view of political and administrative leadership that is committed to the collective well-being of the population in an effective manner.

Politics and Representation

Turning to the political realm we need to focus on representation and participation, democracy’s sine qua non. No matter what definition we follow – whether Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, Lord Dahrendorf’s “pacific regulation of socio-economic conflicts”, or Adam Przeworski’s definition of representative democracy as “the system in which political parties lose elections” – the core of democracy is defined in terms of its systemic and normative regulation of competition for power. Its inner logic is built upon a shared commitment not to stop the ever renewed competition that follows short term political triumphs over adversaries. As such, the comparative advantage of the democratic political system vis-à-vis its alternatives (namely, Fascism, Nazism, and Communism) has been its built-in ability to incorporate the new demands and interests of groups and political movements. One of the most basic conditions for such perpetuation is the existence of channels of open representation.

Studies concerning representation emphasize the formal structure aspect of the electoral system, expecting representation by political parties to express social pluralism. They also point out that the parliamentary organs are those charged with holding a serious and informed debate on actual and future alternatives as part of the policy formation process. According to these views, power-holders are supposed to take decisions in a calibrated way, being fully informed and able to assess information rationally, combining discrete interests with the common good. To what extent do Iberoamerican systems function according to design and model expectations?

Elections seem to function well in the region. Manuel Alcántara (2003) indicates that out of the nearly 100 electoral acts conducted since 1978 only in 4 cases were there indications of impropriety. And yet disenchantment with politicians is high, both in settings where clientelism remains widespread and in those settings less prone to be pervaded by it. The problem is reflected in the discredit of traditional party politics and the rise of ballot absenteeism and no-confidence votes. Even in Colombia, where, compared to other

countries in Iberoamerica, party identification was very strong and volatility in the behavior of politicians was smaller than in Brazil for example, in the 1990s one could perceive a slight increase in electoral absenteeism and no-confidence votes, reflecting public apathy towards representative institutions.

Democracy cannot survive without ensuring institutional channels of representation and participation, whether through political parties or alternative channels. To put it differently, the expression of different interests must be articulated normatively, since otherwise democracy will be drained. The question is how to implement those norms – predicated constitutionally and legally – without reducing the flexibility of the democratic system of renewing itself by incorporating new demands and interests.

In every democracy the pluralism at the basis of representation is in a relationship of tension with the constitutional elements that express a certain common vision of common goals and interests, well beyond the mere discrete interests of particular social sectors. This is why even those individuals and groups that may gain in the short-term from policies benefiting their particular interests can be dissatisfied with the overall performance of the system. Two parallel aspects are crucial for evaluating the systemic capabilities of democracy. First, there is the general obligation to abide by the normative framework of democracy; and second, the combination of the balance of interests and the sense of confidence and will to live in that society, especially in an era of open frontiers and global horizons.

The weakest point of democracy in the region seems to be the relationship between governance and public accountability (O’Donnell 1994, 1998; Alcántara 2003). Historically these democracies have maintained a gap between the formal and rhetorical level and the practical level of operation of politics and governance. Ever since their initiation as independent states, it is possible to note gaps between those principles aimed at generating systemic legitimacy – for example, the division of powers, parliamentary representation, constitutionalism, and entrenched legalism – and the mechanisms aimed at ensuring the aggregation of interests and the elaboration of consensus, mechanisms such as presidential executivism, authoritarianism and clientelism. As far as accountability is concerned I would like to stress its element of inner motivation to abide by a public mission rather than merely being the administrative review of conduct or the rhetoric of the public good. The essential thing in this respect is to generate such motivation for the well-being of the public. This view does not imply the search for a communitarian vision nor subordination to an authoritarian will, but the building of public goodwill. Without governance, there is a sense of widespread loss of public trust and disillusion. Under such conditions public commitment cannot be generated and personal interests overshadow public concerns, without being balanced by a certain vision – pluralistic, of course – of collectivity.

The combination of representation with governance and public commitment in terms of some shared vision of the public good is important. Venezuela seems to have lost this shared vision in the last few years and witnessed political crises and urban and economic deterioration as a result. Contrastingly, after being exhausted by violence, Colombia seems to have reached the point of recovery, on the basis of initiatives made by its most dynamic elites, which have a vision of democratic public co-existence, as shown in the last three administrations of the capital city of Bogotá, a trend that will probably continue under the new mayor, elected in October 2003.
Neo-clientelism and neo-populism

In this connection one of the most striking developments of recent years in Iberoamerica is the emergence of old-new forms of populism and clientelism.

I shall be brief with regard to ‘neo-clientelism’, as I discuss it elsewhere (Roniger 2004). Historian Richard Graham has characterized clientelism as an action-set built upon the principle of “take there, give here”, enabling clients and patrons to benefit from each other’s support as they play in parallel at different levels of political, social and administrative articulation (Graham 1997). Clientelism involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of power and exchange – a non-universalistic quid pro quo between individuals or groups of unequal standing. It implies mediated and selective access to resources and markets from which others are normally excluded. Perhaps it is not surprising that clientelism should reappear, despite the predictions of its decline forecast by theories of modernization, in view of changing macroeconomic policies and given the fact that 200 out of the 516 million inhabitants of the region live in poverty. What is striking is the transformation of its forms, which have become intertwined with civil society and the new discourses of democratic participation and representation.

As the new social movements revolutionalize politics, establishing alternative discursive arenas, challenging dominant practices and achieving at the very least a measure of symbolic power, new constituencies committed to the ideal of rights emerge (Alvarez/Dagnino/Escobar 1998). This in itself does not eliminate the reliance on clientelism, yet it reshapes the terms in which relationships are expressed, as well as the tactics employed by those using them, from ‘favors’ in a patrimonial sense to public services that clienteles demand as their own right. To quote from an analysis of this phenomenon in the Brazilian urban landscape by Robert Gay, in Brazil and probably in other settings as well, clientelism seems to be increasingly

[…] a means to pursue the delivery of collective as opposed to individual goods. This means that political clienteles are less likely to assume the form of loose clusters of independently negotiated dyads than organizations, communities or even whole regions that fashion relationships or reach understandings with politicians, public officials and administrations. In other words, contemporary clientelism exhibits both hierarchical and relational elements and elements of collective organization and identity (Gay 1998: 14).

Despite their differences, in most cases of clientelism one can trace, that such networks are related to the problem under discussion here, the problem of disjuncture between principles and practice in the political arena, clientelism being only one of the major modes of managing access to power by building networks of supporters and followers.

The re-emergence of populism since the 1980s merits special attention, for it is crucial in challenging representative democracy from within in major sectors of these societies. And, as such, it allows us to rethink the workings of the mechanisms of representation in these representative democracies. Both in the more traditional societies (e.g. Bolivia) and in the more mobilized polities (e.g. Chile), leaders have emerged, who – relying symbolically on a popular or even anti-establishment message – have launched promises of immediate solutions to veteran and unsolved problems. Some of them, like Hugo Chávez Frías of Venezuela, are rather personalistic and have put forward an anti-neoliberal program and rhetoric. Others, such as the mayor of Las Condes and 1999
presidential candidate of the UDI, Joaquin Lavín, have based their platform on rightist agendas, while still relying on a strong popular basis and rhetoric. Another example of an anti-neoliberal populist was president Alan García of Perú, while presidents Carlos Menem (Argentina), Alberto Fujimori (Peru) and Fernando Collor de Mello (Brazil) were supporters of the globalizing model of economic development. Indeed, Michael Conniff – editor of two major books on populism in Iberoamerica – one in the 1970s and one in the 1990s – concludes that, with the exception of Hugo Chávez, the wave of populist leaders of the 1980s and 1990s was characterized by their exposure to the international arena, their mastery of ‘global talk’ and their ability to portray themselves as the embodiment of the new global trends, including the use of political marketing as part of their strategy of being in touch with the ‘people’.8

What does this new wave of populism, which is increasingly identified in the literature as “neo-populism” involve? What does it tell us about the workings of these polities, which have enthusiastically endorsed the combined models of democracy and free market and yet are ridden with a generalized sense of disenchantment?

One of the most evident traits of most contemporary instances of neo-populism is its leader-people nexus, with the leader claiming to be the true voice of the democratic sovereign and locus of legitimacy: the ‘people’. This is reflected in the attempt to launch an anti-establishment alternative from within the political center. Reflecting the widespread distrust of traditional politicians, many of the populist leaders portray themselves as expressing the will to get rid of the old forms of elitist and uncommitted politics. Rather than merely supporting the idea of retreat of the state, they reconstruct the latter within the terms of a promise of reform promulgated by the executive leader, well above the formalities of representative democracy.

Another major characteristic is the attempt to recreate a modernist certainty in an era of uncertainties. Whereas in the global arena post-modernism legitimizes the presence of multiple perspectives (asserting that truth assertions are fundamentally “victories in argument” rather than an accurate representation of reality) and multi-culturalism breaks the homogenous cultural program of the nation-state,9 neo-populism holds the promise of recreation of a certainty, reflected in rhetoric and speech that at times is as totalistic as decades ago – even if far from totalitarian – and sometimes even embedded in religious truth.

Often, there is an attempt to recreate the collective identity of the nation. The vision of neo-populist leaders is that they defend the integrity and spirit of the people. Whereas in the past the enemy was the US and its internal supporters, nowadays the terms shift mostly to the internal arena, but the vision is at times as Manichean as in the past. Probably the most outspoken in this has been Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, who portrayed him-
self as the “avenger of people”, leading a Bolivarian Revolution against the “partitocratic oligarchy” entrenched in the institutions. Resulting from this is a re-foundational republican aspiration, which found its way into the reformed constitution of 1999.

There is much in these phenomena which resembles the populism of the 1940s and 1950s and yet many other features are new, which possibly justify their identification as part of neo-populism. In common with the old forms of populism in the region, the current forms evince the following components:

• the leader-masses bond, rooted not only in cognitive-rational elements but in emotive bond, buttressed by a certain style of addressing the masses, directed at the most popular sectors of the population;
• a permanent call to plebiscitary-like decisions. There is a symbolic empowerment of popular sectors through these calls to ‘the people’ instead of citizenship, thus obviating horizontal and vertical accountability;
• the correlate appropriation of voice by the leader, reinforcing what O’Donnell defined as ‘delegative democracy’;
• an emphasis on executive power overriding the division of powers, and often leading to ‘legislation by decree’;
• consequently, a “politics of anti-politics”: the weakening of some of the basic institutions of representative democracy or their manipulation; this reflects and buttresses a more general trend, in which political parties cease to be the promoters and mediators of utopia, in the terms of Manuel Alcantara Sáenz;
• the reliance on multi-class support and concomitantly the tendency to detachment from coherent, clear-cut ideologies (this does not mean ideologization is lacking);
• last but not least, it addresses those social forces hit hard by the new macro-economic policies of structural adjustment and privatization, and projects promises of existential solutions, even when in practice most of them do not disengage from the systemic adherence to free market policies.

These basic components are problematized by other features, which are new when compared to the old forms of populism:

• they are attuned to the global spin of criticism of the political class. Once the system failed to sustain its previous standards of étatist patronage, this triggered the erosion of trust in the political class, even where representative democracy seemed to have been stabilized, as in the case of one of the most enduring democracies of the subcontinent, Venezuela, which lived through a long period of multiparty and bi-party democratic stability (1958-73 and 1973-93 respectively);
• the new leaders have had global exposure and are keen to adopt ‘global talk’ about civil society, democracy, free markets, and global integration;
• whereas the old populism suggested a program of economic independence, shaped by the old model of autarkic capitalism analyzed by Carlos Waismann, most neo-populist projects abide by the logic of integration into global and regional markets.
• they play in a changed political scenario in which franchise has possibly reached its maximum scope, in contrast to the old populist leaders, who rode into power through the enlargement of political and civil rights;
they use the most modern techniques of mass media and political marketing to
recreate the imagined bond between the leader and the people. They usually refrain
from some of the old forms of corporatist organization of mobilized support;

• they also rely on all sorts of networks stemming from civil society. As opposed to
the old scholarly interpretation of Gino Germani and others, which sees populism
striving among a disorganized mass population, the new forms of populism seem
to rely both on associations and NGOs, as well as on a myriad of brokers, patron-
brokers and activists, who organize and mediate between local populations, pop-
ulist leaders and the public administration;

• they therefore do not adopt the old authoritarian modes of control and consequent-
ly can find themselves removed from power through popular mobilizations and
coups d’état aimed at renewing democracy, as in Ecuador in 1997 and 2000, or
through impeachment, as in the case of Brazil in 1992;

• most of them seem to acknowledge the limits of their power and do not attempt –
save very rarely – to opt out of the democratic game. They rather claim to be work-
ing to “democratize democracy”, which makes sense to many witnessing the huge
socio-economic gaps maintained under democracy.

There are significant variations, not only with regard to their stance toward a neo-lib-
eral economy, as discussed above, but also in political terms. In quite highly institution-
alized polities, the styles described are geared to the creation of what I would call a cer-
tain third tier of democratic resonance, as identified and expressed by the leader. A
typical case is that of Joaquín Lavín, which leads a populism coming from one of the
forces that supported Pinochet and who, while personalizing politics, launched policies
of mobilization of young, popular and female sectors, through a combination of old and
new, that is strongly reminiscent of Gianfranco Fini’s political bases of support in Italy.

In less institutionalized polities such as Ecuador or Bolivia, the logics of neo-pop-
ulism become entrenched in the perception of direct participatory democracy as the
‘true’ democracy. In these societies, substantial sectors recognize an aboriginal ascen-
dance and relate to images of autochthonous models of leadership and communal
accountability which differ from Western models. Accordingly, there are widespread
unfulfilled expectations of a more responsive form of doing politics, which under the
right circumstances can evolve into street demonstrations and occupations of public
space, interpreted as the expression of direct popular democracy. This mounting pressure
and popular mobilization has been rather effective in recent years in bringing national
leaders to abdicate power. Thus in Ecuador mass mobilization led to coups d’état and the
removal of presidents Bucaram and Mahuad in 1997 and 2000 respectively. In Bolivia
the continuous public presence and protest of Indians in September and October 2003
contributed to bringing down a national president who despite his rhetoric of participa-
tion led a program of privatizations and closer economic ties with the US and Chile.

The tensions inherent in this logic of doing politics are obvious. First, there is a con-
stant threat to the institutionalization of representative democracy in its minimalist ver-
sion. Second, it reflects the persistence of unfulfilled countervailing visions of democra-
cy. Third, there is the renewed projection of the old organicist ideas of the ‘people’ as
sovereign and the republican commitment to their entitlement to social justice, which
contradicts the logic of the free market, often burdened by political corruption. That is,
some visions of communitarian and participatory democracy can be expected to persist, buttressed by recurrent outbursts of occupation of public space, which the combination of populist rhetoric and ineffective policies recreate in the center of the public sphere.

Participatory democratic practices

The G-7 societies have been able to maintain high levels of voluntary participation in local politics and organizations from within civil society. Sydney Tarrow has traced some of the characteristics of this profound transformation:

It brings activists further into the realms of tolerated and prescribed politics and makes possible relations of working trust with public officials. It has produced hybrid forms of behavior that cross the boundaries of the polity and link grass-root activists to public interest groups, parties, and public officials. On the one hand, these new forms of activism are unlikely to sustain high levels of confidence in government, and they may discourage public trust by demonstrating the inadequacy of governmental performance. On the other hand, they do not create enduring negative subcultures. Their variable form and shifting organizations, their tendency to produce rapid and rapidly liquidated coalitions, and their focus on issues of short- and medium-term issues rather than fully fledged ideologies do not produce enduring membership commitments or deeply held loyalties outside the polity (Tarrow 2000: 289).

Various macro-sociological factors have led to a deep change in that direction: the erosion of the centralizing models of the authoritarian and communist countries, the diffusion of the participatory model of civil society in the tradition identified by De Tocqueville in the USA and the erosion of the idea of the nation-state in its homogenizing and dominative character; all these have contributed to generating the conditions for the legitimacy of a new participatory pluralism. In this new format, citizens are conceived of as able to disagree democratically, to develop public will and to acquire skills that once were limited to the traditional political and administrative elites. In this pattern, typical of the affluent societies of the West, citizens have free-floating resources that can be invested in the public arena, through organizational impetus and associational networks for example.

Both from the perspective of republicanism, as well as from procedural approaches, this trend is expected to reinforce democracy. From a republican perspective, the political community perceives itself as auto-governable, which in complex and pluralistic societies forces negotiations over public programs and shared normative frameworks. From the perspective of procedural democracy, participation is fundamental too, facilitating the structuring of deliberative models, be they those of Jürgen Habermas, built upon rational and legal procedures of deliberation and formation of public opinion, or a model such as John Dewey’s, one of social cooperation and the practical establishment of reflexive and autonomous initiatives, in the tradition of civil society.

In Iberoamerica many sectors lack such free-floating resources. The existential realities of widespread poverty, unemployment or partial employment, urban and rural violence reinforce the logics of exclusion. We witness in these societies a double process of dualization, first between stronger and weaker socio-economic groups that somehow function as civil societies at different levels – through social and political articulation
and through protest. The second process of dualization separates the above groups, which somehow relate to the state, and those marginal groups that live outside organized society, beyond the formal economy and outside the control of the state, be it positively or negatively phrased (Sznajder/Roniger 2003). In this kind of democracy it is typical for large sectors to be sidelined, with little autonomous access to goods and services, and to lack a capacity to fully participate in the public sphere due to their placement at the margins of society, economy, and politics. Other sectors continue to have mediated access to markets of goods and services and to use the clientelist networks to connect to the political system and the public administration.

And yet there is a long tradition of parallel attempts to generate such participatory social and political capital, mostly futile in the past and recently successful. Practices such as electoral control in Mexico or the model of participatory budgeting in Brazilian cities such as Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte are exemplary. In Brazil, following the reform of the constitution, there has been a process of institutional innovation based upon a tripartite structure that involves public administrators together with professionals and local delegates representing civil society in the process of provision of public services, tying the translation of macro policies to the daily practice of making decisions over the nature of services, their costs and the quality of their provision. In Brazil, one can witness in the impoverished and dry hinterland of Ceará, one of the poorest settings of the Northeast, a new willingness to contribute resources to public projects, in addition to the funds delivered from the federal and state levels, as a result of these changes in the articulation of local participation in decision-making (fieldwork, March-April 2002).

According to Iberoamerican researchers, recent experience suggests an alternative to the elitist theories of democracy. According to the elitist theories, democracy will exist wherever there is a fair political game of recurring competition for power, structured through electoral decisions. The origins of such a minimalist definition – focusing on the selection of political leadership and the election of government – can be traced to the inter-war period in Europe, when mass mobilizations disrupted the political systems of the first wave of democratization. Something similar occurred at the end of Cold War, when the violence on the right and the left disarticulated many of the democratic systems of the Third World, through the wave of protests, manifestations and mass mobilizations which led to the crystallization of guerrilla warfare, paramilitary and state violence. The legacy of such collective experience had its political impact in the form of wide acceptance of theories that, like Dahl’s, looked for the minimal parameters of operation and survival of democracy. In contrast, authors such as Boaventura de Santos, Leonardo Avitzer, Adriana Delgado and, beyond the American continent, also Chantal Mouffe, have suggested that these experiences should prompt a wider view of the relations between democracy and the formation of a public space in which citizens participate as equals and public decisions are taken through the open discussion of political projects.

This alternative approach puts emphasis on the practices taking shape in the public sphere, where rulers and citizens have a mutual influence on each other. It suggests viewing democracy as a series of practices which can be deepened through citizenship participation: practices such as electoral control in Mexico, the communal action committees in Colombia and the participatory budgeting and tripartite health and education commissions in Brazil. In the latter, the setting of clear-cut and transparent criteria in advance, for budget transference, aimed at reducing the misuse of public monies, combined with crite-
ria of subsidiarity that contemplate the differential needs of the various regions, provinces and states. This pattern is particularly important for the federal countries of the region. Through steady participation and deliberation, these avenues of citizen involvement emerge as a major means for intensifying democracy, especially in those societies in which there are strong pressures for participation and, on the other hand, exclusion, remnants of elitism and widespread public distrust, especially among the popular classes.

By invigorating democratic practices at the local level, the destabilizing potential of limited democracy and the anarchic disarticulation of the public sphere could be defused. These initiatives could overturn the tendency of erosion of public confidence in representative democracy while taking advantage of the capacity of democracy – over alternative political systems – to address pluralism, dynamically incorporate new demands and reinforce the constitution of free public spheres. In the context of Iberoamerica these initiatives may perhaps also reduce the populist and clientelistic trends still in existence.

Conclusions

Even though today we are conscious of the fact that there is not one but multiple models of modernity, even in Iberoamerica (Braig 1992, 1999; Eisenstadt 2002), we still tend intuitively to look for the ideal institutional format which will be the definitive solution for the problems of democracy. Moreover, political marketing has become fashionable, orienting the use of media strategies as political weapons for identifying preferences, orienting public opinion and capturing votes. Even if one recognizes their importance, the emphasis on the ways in which we practice politics cannot obviate dealing with deficiencies in the workings of public institutions.

The search for the ideal model has led many to think, for example, that some democracies are successful due to their electoral format, which seems to be better than others, or that the issue of optimal representation can be formally resolved by an intelligent use of the mass media or a referendum. We should keep in mind that the vitality of representative democracy cannot be dissociated from the nourishing of shared ideas regarding the public good, elaborated democratically, nor from the generation of social capital, vital for institutional transformations, as illustrated by Sudarsky (2001) for Colombia. In order to invigorate democracy, I do not believe that political marketing or media strategies are enough.

Accordingly, this article analyzed both some innovative initiatives aimed at the institutionalization of democratic controls on the local scene, and also the phenomena of neo-clientelism and neo-populism. These two trends seem almost contradictory and yet both point out the need to address current problems in the workings of representative democracy and in the connection between the public agenda and the markets. Beyond its concrete contribution, this analysis made a claim to the importance of rethinking the public realm as a focus for the re-creation of sociability, the forging of collective identity and the building of a shared sense of future. In practical terms, for democracies overloaded with poverty, unemployment and exclusion, this means that work has to be done to improve public performance and efficacy, to promote and safeguard public goods and to intensify the equation of growth-redistribution-and-inclusion instead of the inverse equation of stagnation-(recession or decline)-widening socio-economic gaps-exclusion.
suggested that democratic institutions may and should be improved, and that this is a task that must go beyond the mere formal format of institutions.

References


