| Abstract: | In the first decades of the 20th century, Brazil formed an ‘unwritten alliance’ with the United States. This changed when Brazilian governments began to focus on the country’s national development and Washington did not give anything back for Brazil’s loyalty. In 1961, Jânio Quadros launched the concept of Política Externa Independente, which really came into its own during the military regime, especially during Geisel’s government (1974-1979). In the middle of the Cold War, Brazil developed many new bilateral and multilateral relationships, including with communist countries. Some of his predecessors had been more aligned with Washington, and are considered entreguistas, while those developing an independent policy are called nacionalistas. This pendulum movement does also happen in times of democratic regimes. Cardoso was much more aligned to Washington, especially during his first mandate, while Lula really put Brazil on the world map.

Keywords: | Foreign policy; Política Externa Independente; Nacionalistas; Entreguistas; Brazil.


Palavras-Chaves: | Política Externa Independente; Nacionalistas; Entreguistas; Brasil.
INTRODUCTION

In the first decades of the 20th century, Brazil formed an ‘unwritten alliance’ with the United States, according to Bradford Burns. However, in the country’s period of national development (1930-1989), Brazilian policies became more global and much less restricted to Washington. In 1961 the President of Brazil, Jânio Quadros, established the Política Externa Independente (PEI, Independent foreign policy], which meant not towing automatically the American line and really thriving to pursue foreign policies to further the country’s national development. But, this independent policy only really came to fruition during the military regime (1964-1985), in particular during the Geisel Government (1974-1979). Geisel really put Brazil on the world map and started numerous alliances, including with communist governments. But it is after the return and consolidation of democracy, especially in the 21st century, that Brazilian foreign policy initiatives have multiplied. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula (2003-2010), in particular, has been extremely active in developing a number of regional, intercontinental, mostly south-south, and even global initiatives.

This paper will study to what extent Brazilian foreign policy has really become independent, capable of developing more autonomy, and how its policies and cooperation with the United States has evolved over these decades. Is there a pendulum movement between governments establishing independent policies, considered nacionalistas and those more aligned to Washington, known as entreguistas? To what extent does this change in policies depend on the national governments or on external factors? After setting the historical context, the focus will be on foreign policies during the military regime, especially Geisel’s government, and during the democratic governments, in particular that of Lula.

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNTIL THE MILITARY REGIME

In the nineteenth century Brazilian foreign policy was very dependent on the United Kingdom, as was the case of many (Latin American) countries. That country played a foremost role in the financial, economic areas, as well as in the sector of infrastructure and utilities, although the Brazilian government kept the control over the railways it considered of crucial importance. British, German and American companies were also of paramount importance for the export and valorisation programmes of coffee, for a long time Brazil’s main export product. Britain started to lose its privileged position in the twentieth century when the United States becomes Brazil’s most important economic partner (Miller 1993: 133-137, 160-162, 166-167; Dean 1989: 244-256; Topik 1998: 50-60). Brazilian foreign policy became aligned with Washington. That really started under the Barão de Rio Branco, who was minister of foreign affairs from 1902 until 1912, and is considered the founding father of Brazilian foreign policy. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1889, he had
already started settling some territorial disputes, expanding Brazil’s territory at the same time, which he continued during his ministry, as well as establishing treaties with the remaining countries, so as to secure the frontiers with its ten neighbours (Drouleurs 2001: 124-145). Since then, Brazil lives in peace with all its neighbours, which is exceptional for a country of this size and with so many neighbours. It is sufficient to look at the situation of Russia, China and India, the last one much smaller. Other countries of comparable size have just one neighbour, Canada, or two, the United States. Coexisting peacefully with its neighbours has always been a cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy (Lafer 2007: 43-49).

With over 8.5 million km², Brazil ranks fifth in the world and size is considered an important element in the positioning of Brazil in a global context. For Brazilian intellectuals, diplomats and politicians, size is not only a reference to the continental dimensions of the country but also to its population, over nearly 205 million in 2015, also fifth in world ranking, and to its “industrial structures and significant internal markets” (Guimarães 1999: 21,102). Darc Costa underlines one more crucial element: next to its continentalidade its marinidade (2003: 79). Brazil has over 7500 km coast and a number of archipelagos in the Atlantic Ocean. The Ocean always played a foremost role in Brazilian development and it has become even more important in recent years after the discoveries of many resources, including enormous off-shore oil and gas, in pre-salt deposits (Koning 2015).

Having settled the frontiers, Rio Branco looked more to Washington than London, which was also more in tune with the young republic. It is during his ministry that the ‘unwritten alliance’ with the United States (US) was established. In 1905, in Rio de Janeiro, the US opened its only embassy in South America and the American Secretary of State visited Brazil in 1906. Brazil was often the American go-between in South America (Burns 1993: 280-285). However, in the 1930’s, under Vargas, this started to change slowly when the Brazilian government starts its programme of national development, known as desenvolvimentismo. For the first time, although in a limited way, foreign policy becomes a part of the government’s strategy to further the country’s industrialisation. Furthermore, in that decade, Germany and the US were competing to increase their influence in Brazil, which gave Vargas more room for negotiation. That changed under Dutra’s government (1946-1951), which followed Washington again as did Kubitschek (1956-1961) in his first years. This president, who really pushed Brazil’s national development forward, especially its industrialisation, tried a more autonomous path, from 1958 onwards, following in Vargas’s footsteps (Visentini 1994: 24-28). His successor, Jânio Quadros, although only in power for seven months, left an important legacy in the area of foreign policy, as he established the PEI. According to Henrique Altemani de Oliveira, the PEI really starts in 1961 and was kept until 1964, under Goulart, although in those years, it is more “an intention, a discourse”, which will be implemented in the Geisel government (2008: 91-92). However this discourse was extremely important as it changed Brazil’s foreign policy, and became more geared to “support its objective of national development, also a goal of other
nations, with which we wish to develop closer relationships”. It was highly significant because Brazil looked at its own interests, not those of others (2008: 91-92). For Brazil, this was innovative.

This entailed looking for new markets, particularly in the South, in the rest of Latin America, and in other continents, Africa, Asia and Oceania. There was a special emphasis on Africa, not only to find new markets but also to give support to countries that were fighting for their independence. In 1961, Afonso Arinos was the first Foreign Minister to visit an African country. One of the main points made in the Goulart Government, and presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 and 1962, by Afonso Arinos, addressed the link between development and international trade, explaining how the world market situation did work against the interests of developing countries. Measures taken by blocs such as the European Economic Community hindered exports of products from developing countries. This led to the First United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. Its objective was to formulate systems achieving reasonable prices for raw materials and agricultural products from developing countries, as well as fostering their process of industrialisation (Oliveira 2008: 92-96).

In 1962, Brazil was also one of the countries that argued in favour of non-intervention and against the expulsion of Cuba from the Organisation of American States. Together with Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, it abstained (Gonçalves, Miyamoto, 1993: 211-246). On the other hand, Mônica Hirst considers that the period of automatic alignment started in 1942, when Brazil joined the Allies in the fight against the Axis countries, until 1977, when Geisel started its autonomous policy (2006: 91-97).

In fact, it could be said that within Brazil itself there are two main tendencies: the nationalists versus the so-called *entreguistas*. This division in these two groups started in the 50s, when the *entreguistas* automatically aligned themselves to the American position, without asking for any compensation, or without considering if this alignment was positive for Brazil, while the nationalists wanted to foster national development and take the necessary measures to that end (Manzur 1999: 49-53). Amado Luiz Cervo coined these two groups as *independentistas*, or nationalists and *associacionistas* or those in favour of alignment, the two tendencies that marked the Brazil of the 30s to the 90s. According to Cervo, the “parameters of the thinking of the *independen- tistas* prevailed, although tempered in practice by the influence of *associacionistas*”. Vargas, Kubitschek and Quadros belong to the nationalist tendency (Cervo 2008: 15-20). Guimarães starts his analysis from independence, outlining a list of patriots: the Baron of Mauá, Alves Branco, Roberto Simonsen, Getúlio Vargas, Juscelino Kubitschek, Celso Furtado and Ernesto Geisel who “understood the need to promote the industrialisation of the country, to build, expand and integrate its domestic market, to develop their technological capacity, to diversify its relations with the outside world and to reduce its vulnerability and dependence on so-called great powers, former colonial metropolises, or neo-colonial metropolis” (2006: 345). These two tendencies
are also reflected during the military regime, in the middle of the Cold War. Different military governments are more or (much) less aligned with the US and these tendencies continue after the return to democracy.

BRAZIL’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE MILITARY REGIME

After the military coup of 1964, Brazil, once more aligned itself with Washington. The US Embassy in Brazil, the State Department and the Pentagon had not only supported but even given the incentive for the military coup (Toledo 2004: 22). As quid pro quo, the Brazilian government hoped for substantial American support, in particular help to develop the national economy and reduce the enormous shortages in defence material. This Brazilian position was not new, but the original aspect was to show the US the great utility in strengthening Brazil’s potential, as both countries shared the same values. These ideas were developed by Golbery do Couto e Silva, linked to the Brazilian National War College. Golbery had written *Geopolítica do Brasil*, published in the 50s, which recommended the transformation of Brazil in major world power (apud Gonçalves, Miyamoto 1993: 213-214).

Practically, at the start of the military regime, the Castelo Branco government (1964-1967) broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba because that country was suspected of covering up “propaganda activities of its agents” in Brazil (Garcia 2005: 191). The diplomats closest to PEI, were turned away by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or resigned. A number of diplomats were also dismissed (Visentini 1998: 26-28). However, when Juracy Magalhães became Minister of Foreign Affairs, while, on the one hand, he stated that what was good for the US was good for Brazil, that Brazil should respect its history and culture, and was part of the Western world, and ‘be loyal to the western world’, *id est* the US, on the other hand, the country should also follow its independent foreign policy. He stressed in particular that Brazil was looking towards Eastern Europe to expand its trade, as long as it was mutually beneficial. He also wanted to develop “full cooperation with Africa and Asia”, as well as a “necessary economic integration with Latin America, our natural habitat” (Magalhães, apud Visentini 1998: 28-29). Meanwhile, in 1965, the Minister of Planning, Roberto Campos, considered so pro-American that he was called Bob Fields by nationalists, had visited the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (USSR), followed, two months later, by the first Joint Commission Brazil-USSR. Diplomatic relations had been restored in 1961 after having been broken off in 1947. The Kubitschek Government had resumed trade relations with the Soviet Union because the USSR had begun to set up aid programmes for developing countries: providing loans at low interest rates, the possibility of barter and, of crucial importance, providing technology transfer, a difficult area of cooperation with the US and other industrialised countries. Besides Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay had also re-established trade relations with the USSR (Silva 2004: 106-108; Visentini 1998: 25; Visentini 1995: 157-158).
In the meantime, the US was not willing to give the expected support. On the other hand, the United States had hoped that Brazil would send troops to Vietnam, which the Brazilian government was not willing to do, only expressing its solidarity. The Castelo Branco government was disappointed by Washington’s position, although it mentioned that relations between both countries “were excellent, but even so there were areas of disagreement” (Silva 2004: 75-77). Therefore, the search for alternatives went on bilaterally and multilaterally. A great number of bilateral negotiations took place, on the continent itself, in western and socialist Europe and in Africa. This was also the case for multilateral negotiations, which were mostly concentrated in different UN institutions, such as UNCTAD, where Brazil tried to lead the demands of developing countries, but also at the Sixth Round of Negotiations of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Multilateral diplomacy was especially strong during the Costa e Silva government (1967-1969). This government also considered the nuclear topic of fundamental importance. Although in favour of nuclear disarmament in Latin America and non-proliferation, Brazil refused to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty, as proposed by the US and the USSR. The government wanted to develop nuclear energy for its economic and technological development. This government’s motto for foreign policy, “Prosperity Diplomacy”, was quite different from the previous one and could be considered a form of PEI, although it would never state this as such (Pereira 2010: 30-32, 38-41, 49-50; Santana 2006: 158).

Under the Medici Government (1969-1974), Brazil’s foreign policy was based on ‘Diplomacy of National Interest’, where besides multilateral actions, the focus would be on bilateral relations to stimulate national development. One of the areas of interest was the Middle East, of crucial importance as a provider of oil. Brazil was the seventh oil importer in the world. At the same time, a big effort was made to reduce the negative trade balance with that region (Santana 2006: 158-161). But, it should also be remembered that these were the years of the “economic miracle” with an average annual growth of over 11% per year, reaching 14% in 1973. In that year, the growth in Latin America was 8.4% and globally 6.1%. The next government, that of Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) could not replicate these results. This was largely due to the oil crisis, although the goals stated in the 1974 National Development Plan II, was of an average annual growth of 10%, and 12% for industry. In fact, during the Geisel government, the average annual growth decreased to 6.7%, although industry got an enormous impulse. (Macarini 2011: 32-36, 43-44). This Plan constituted the second wave of import substitution industrialisation. The number of state owned enterprises increased substantially. Two areas were considered very relevant in the search of more autonomy: petrochemicals and informatics, with the establishment of a “domestic industry for electronic components and inputs, technological autonomy (vis à vis other countries) and also a national equipment industry” (Knight 2014: 20). Diversification in the area of energy was another priority. One of the main objectives was the reduction of Brazil’s dependence on oil, after the oil crisis of 1973. Therefore, huge investments were made in developing hydroelectricity, nuclear energy and fuel for cars made
from alcohol that came from sugar cane, a renewable energy. Germany, for instance, played a crucial role in the development of Brazil’s nuclear energy. As the Americans were exerting pressure against the nuclear cooperation with Germany, President Geisel ended the Brazilian American Military Agreement, established in 1952 (Pereira 2010: 87-89, 110; Visentini 2003: 52-53).

In this period, Brazil’s foreign policy became truly diversified and global, implementing numerous bilateral relations, because, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Azaredo da Silveira, underlined during a speech in 1974 at the Escola Superior do Exército, there could be “no automatic alignments as diplomatic actions should be based on situations not countries. Diplomacy should be pragmatic” (apud Santana 2006: 165) It would be the period of Geisel’s “Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism”. This Government really followed an independent foreign policy and put Brazil on the world map (Santana 2006: 163-166; Visentini 2003, 49-51).

With its concern over access to oil, one of its priorities was to intensify relations with Arab countries. Bilateral agreements were signed with Kuwait, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Between 1974-1979, Iraq became an important partner, and Brazil exported a broad range of products, industrial, agricultural, resources and infrastructure to that country (Santana 2006: 169-170). Brazil was also very present in Africa. Brazil was the first to recognise the newly independent country Marxist Angola. It had good relations with Mozambique and other African countries. Brazilian positions were actively defended on the multilateral stage and in particular towards Africa, Brazil was a great protagonist. Besides Germany, the government intensified relations with other European countries and Japan, strategic partners, in trade, investments and technology transfer. To that end, relations were also established with a number of socialist countries (Visentini 2003: 52). In 1974, diplomatic relations were re-established with the People’s Republic of China. Chino-Brazilian relations included technological cooperation, for example the joint development of satellites besides trade. Furthermore, Brazil and China had similar stances on a couple of issues, such as ensuring national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and total opposition to any interference concerning human rights (Oliveira 2004: 12-14). In the second half of the seventies, within Latin America, Brazil started the Amazon Cooperation Treaty (ACT) as a way to protect the sovereignty of the eight countries forming part of the Amazon region, and to set up some joint strategies to develop that region (Visentini 2003: 53). It was a way to strengthen Brazil’s cooperation with its neighbours, not an easy endeavour as many neighbours had border issues with their other neighbours, but Silveira pulled it off. It was also a way to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Argentina (Spektor 2002: 132).

The policy of Geisel’s “responsible and ecumenical pragmatism” was followed by Figueiredo’s “universalism” (1979-1985). The last president of the military regime had to govern in a difficult period, nationally and internationally. Brazil suffered from the second oil crisis and even more from the financial policies introduced by the American government. It began with the end of the gold standard in 1971, the devaluation of
the dollar in 1973 and foremost with the sudden great increase of the interest rate in 1979, which was kept quite high well into 1981. These financial policies, especially the increase in interest rates penalised the countries in the south as the prices of commodities fell dramatically, leading to the debt crisis (Serrano 2002: 249-250). The 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War only increased the problems in South America. Although Figueiredo’s administration wanted to continue Geisel’s foreign policies, the economic problems and the international developments, such as a weaker USSR, while Japan and Europe became more aligned towards the US, made that quite difficult. Relations with Africa and the Middle East, on the other hand, were easier to maintain. Figueiredo was the first Brazilian president to visit African countries. One of the issues that the Brazilian government wanted to prevent was the militarization of the South Atlantic. South Africa, under the apartheid regime, together with Argentina and the US were working on such a project, therefore it was important to intensify bilateral relations with other African countries (Visentini 2003: 62-66; Pereira, 2010: 129-130; Barbosa 2015: 87-89, 91). The more pro-Arab stance, a change from the previous policy of equidistance, which was started under Geisel’s government, was reinforced during Figueiredo’s, with the opening in Brasilia of an Office of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Santana 2006: 158, 167-168, 175).

THE RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC REGIMES, FROM 1985 ONWARDS

Within the region, relations with Argentina, which had been quite tense under Geisel, improved under Figueiredo’s administration, as the partnership with Argentina became a cornerstone in Brazil’s foreign policy. Brazil supported Argentina’s claim to the Malvinas, in the 1982 war, which Argentina lost. It was the start of a number of bilateral agreements between both countries (Spektor 2002: 126-132). The bilateral partnership increased during the first civilian government, that of José Sarney (1985-1990), although not yet directly elected, and was reflected in the 1986 Argentine-Brazilian Integration Act, which contained a number of bilateral protocols. The 1988 Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development was the first step to bilateral integration, which would have included setting up “certain integrated production units for the purpose of promoting sensitive technologies in sectors considered strategic for the economic development” (Spektor 2002: 136). During Sarney’s government, this partnership was enhanced as foreign policy became even more difficult because of the new global order, the high US interest rates, the increasing debts of Latin American countries, Brazil amongst them, which resulted in the Lost Decade for that region. The Brazilian government had less room for manoeuvre and concentrated itself on its own hemisphere. Besides the structural rapprochement with Argentina, the administration started partnerships with other Latin American countries, including Mexico and other middle powers from the South, such as South Africa and India. However, despite the problems of that decade, the Brazilian
government continued to seek diversification in partnerships to avoid “over-dependence, whether political or economic, on one of the centres of international power” (Sennes 2003: 121-124).

During Sarney’s government, another initiative that had started under the military regime was set up. This concerned the attention for the South Atlantic, a zone of interest for Brazil, and African countries on the other side of the Ocean, foremost Nigeria and Angola. In 1986, 12 African countries with an Atlantic coast and 3 South American ones, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay became partners and formed the Zone for Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA), which was approved by a UN resolution 41/11 in 1986, with one vote of the US against and eight abstentions, mostly by European, such as the UK, France, and also by Japan. The objectives were twofold, foremost to keep powers of the north out of the South Atlantic, in particular the US. Furthermore, the South Atlantic should become a nuclear free zone, and the countries should cooperate to foster their own development (Barbosa 2015: 86-97). It was an important statement. Since then the number of African member states has increased to 21 and the cooperation has since been adapted to the post cold-war period, maintaining questions of defence and cooperation (Barbosa 2015: 98-130).

However, it is during the nineties that a number of fundamental changes occur. With the return to democracy, a new phase, national and international, begins for Brazil. The national development policies are abandoned and the country enters the neoliberal era. The Collor de Mello government (1990-1992) opens the market and lowers tariffs without asking for any compensation. The establishment of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), in 1991, should also be seen in this perspective, as Paraguay and Uruguay had lower tariffs than Brazil and Argentina and they did not have a development project (Visentini 2003: 80-84; Sennes 2003: 119).

After Collor’s impeachment, Itamar Franco (1992-1995), tries to apply some brakes to this process. However it is under the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) that the neoliberal agenda is really implemented, and to that end, even the 1988 constitution is changed to allow for re-election of the president. The Real Plan is introduced, with a strong currency tied to the dollar, not as rigidly as in Argentina, but it still makes exports more expensive, and as a consequence, for the first time, the trade balance is negative. Furthermore the government introduces an austere monetary policy; sky-high interest rates, which has a negative effect on economic growth. And last but not least, according to the recipe of the International Monetary Fund, large state owned enterprises, which were doing quite well, are privatized, leading to serious employment problems, among others (Visentini 2003: 92-94). Opening the economy is considered an international insertion strategy, but, in general, Latin American society was very unhappy with its results. It was followed by social upheaval and the electoral loss of all neoliberal governments, as social exclusion has reached around 40% of Latin American population by 2003, according to data from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, known as ECLAC (Cervo 2008: 22). But this was the way to go —what Marga-
Thatcher coined TINA: there is no alternative—or the consequence of “prevailing circumstances”, the expression used by Cardoso and Lafer—“the global interdependence that embarrassed the neoliberal mind would not allow an alternative to decision-making in foreign policy. ... Neoliberalism claimed, moreover, a revolution in science, in politics and thought” (Cervo 2008: 22-23).

However, there was criticism against asymmetrical globalisation, and scepticism about Cardoso’s neoliberalism, among others, in “ways of inconsistency or post consistency?” according to Cervo (2008: 23-24). Thus, in the last years of Cardoso’s government, more policies are developed to defend the country’s national interests and it negotiates more and is not making concessions without compensation. One of the important initiatives set up by Brazil is the first meeting of South American presidents in Brasilia in 2000. One of the major results of this conference was the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), a very ambitious project of regional integration through the development of networks of roads, water ways, railways, harbours, telecommunications, pipelines, etc. The different projects which have been set up in South America were also a reaction to US initiatives, first President Bush’s 1990 Initiative for the Americas, a start to boost hemispheric trade cooperation, and then the 1994 proposal for the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas for the whole hemisphere, after the North American Free Trade Agreement had come into force on January 1994. Brazil was at the forefront establishing different forms of cooperation, such as Mercosur and IIRSA (Becard 2009: 96-103; Visentini/Wiesebron 2004).

At the same time, in the nineties, the Brazilian government modifies the positions it had before, instead of stating it is part of the Third World it tries to become part of the First World, as according to Fernando Henrique Cardoso “O Brasil não é subdesenvolvido, mas sim um país injusto” (Lahoz 1999). In this decade there is again a greater convergence between Brazil and the US, a stage which Hirst calls adjustment, an affinity with Western political values, especially after 9-11-2001, but also great differences. Topics which Brazilian governments did not consider “subject to negotiation” became acceptable in the nineties, such as discussions on the strengthening of democratic values, human rights, the fight against drug trafficking, and the environment. This change in attitude is well illustrated by the fact that the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development was held in Rio de Janeiro. However, the country maintains a non-interventionist position, unlike the US. The country did not give its support either to the attack of Afghanistan, under American leadership, or to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Hirst 2006: 97-103, 111-114).

Meanwhile, there was another crucial topic where Cardoso took a different position to his predecessors, as in 1998 he signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The military presidents and Sarney had not considered this topic negotiable, in spite of American pressure, as they had objected to the intrinsic imbalance between the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS), and the fact that there is no way that NNWS can have an impact on NWS to keep their side
of the bargain and get rid of weapons with nuclear warheads (Oliveira 2008: 67-72; Sennes 2003: 120). Cardoso also did not deem it useful to invest in defence, as there is “a real ring of peace around the country” as was stated in the 1996 Política de Defesa Nacional.1 While the military governments had invested quite substantially in the development of a national defence industry, during the Cardoso government a lot of the military equipment became obsolete. Under Lula, especially in his second mandate, the issue of the importance of defence, investment in defence equipment, was again put on the agenda. His 2005 Política de Defesa Nacional (PND) was followed in 2008 by the Estratégia Nacional de Defesa, approved as decree 6.703 on December 18.2 Almeida made an interesting table showing the difference in defence policies under the Cardoso and Lula governments, and highlighting in how far Lula’s policies were innovative (2010: 244-245). In particular, the PND was very innovative as it made Brazil’s new objectives in the area of defence quite clear, the tasks of the three military forces, their cooperation, the need to invest in national defence industry. Brazil must be able to protect itself and its sovereignty and, moreover, as an emerging power, it also needs to invest in its hard power, although it strongly favours soft power (Nye 1990: 153-171; Wilson 2008: 110-122). To that end, Brazil has signed a number of military strategic partnerships, which always include the transference of technology. The strategic partnership considered the most relevant is the one signed with France, also in 2008, for the construction of conventional and nuclear submarines and a specific harbour for submarines in Brazil. Conforming to the 1988 Constitution and the NPT, the nuclear submarine will not have nuclear warheads. Even so the acquisition of the nuclear submarine is a Brazilian ambition (Melo 2015: 164-170). After Lula, President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2018), has also taken measures to strengthen Brazil’s national defence industry, with special incentives for the acquisition of defence equipment.3 It is part of the development of nuclear technology, as the PND also made it crystal clear that the development of national nuclear, cyber and space technologies is of paramount importance for the country’s independence. In the same year 2008, Brazil signed an agreement with Argentina to start a partnership for the joint development of a nuclear reactor. The country, which has huge deposits of uranium, is also developing enriched uranium (Oliveira 2008: 64-66, 75-77). Furthermore, again in the year 2008, another Brazilian initiative led to the establishment

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of the South-American Defence Council within the framework of Union of South American Nations, known as Unasur. It was a way to create a stable region, as there were tensions in the Andes, to work on a joint security project, create possibilities for the joint acquisition of military equipment, and to create an institution that is following its own objectives, not those of the US (Varas 2008: 4-7).

It is not only in this area that Lula makes his mark. During his government, from 2003 onwards, the tide began to change nationally, with a major project of social inclusion, which began as Fome Zero, but became an integrated and complex programme, known as *Bolsa Familia*. Together with a number of other programmes, poverty in Brazil was reduced drastically and consumption increased substantially. Lula put the fight against poverty also on the international agenda, in the World Economic Forum in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Moreover, the government conceived a series of programmes to generate (the first) job(s), allowing the purchase of housing at reasonable terms, getting electricity to isolated places, and since 2007, the Acceleration Growth Programme to stimulate the economy (Wiesebron 2014: 126-149). These social policies have an influence on foreign policy and allow a positive perspective on globalization with “the notions of sovereignty, national interest, and integration based on ‘developmentalism’ taken seriously,” according to Visentini (2003:103-105). This enables the country to fully develop all actions taken bilaterally and multilaterally, and allows for the full international insertion of Brazil. Within the region, regional cooperation evolves a project for the whole of South America, Unasur, which started in 2004, given more form in 2008, again an original process of regional integration as it encompasses all countries of South America, including Surinam and Guyana and goes well beyond economic cooperation. It is also an area of cooperation strongly supported by Dilma (Visentini 2014: 62-75).

Besides initiatives in the region, Lula has been extremely active, while not forgetting the north, foremost developing south-south activities, many of them in Africa, but also in Asia. President Lula has stated that solidarity with Africa was a question of ethics but also economic common sense. Health diplomacy, assistance in the fight against HIV/AIDS, is one of the many activities Brazil developed on that continent (Schleicher 2015: 94-99). The most important African partner for Brazil is South Africa and in 2003, in Brasilia, the Forum of the India-Brazil-Africa was launched, bringing together “three of the most vibrant and globally active democracies of the developing world to engage in issues of international importance and mutual benefit .... giving priority to the south ... the size and relevance of IBSA in the global political economy offer a unique opportunity for a southern coalition to move to the centre of the emerging new world order” (IBSA 2003). In recent years, IBSA has been somehow overshadowed by the development of the BRIC, Brazil, Russia, India and China, a concept launched in 2001, by Jim O’Neil, as the emerging powers had a “healthier outlook: bigger growth than G7 on shorter and longer term” (2001). This concept became a reality when the BRIC started summit meetings in 2009. From 2011 onwards, the group became BRICS, when South Africa was included. The most important re-
sult of the cooperation is the establishment of a BRICS development bank, which was launched in 2014, in Fortaleza, with Dilma as host. This new financial institution has an enormous impact because it is the first time that anything new is set up outside the Bretton Woods system (Stuenkel 2015). This is most definitely a form of PEI.

CONCLUSION

The Política Externa Independente, established in 1961, really started to flourish under the military regime. At the start of the military regime in 1964, after a beginning of total alignment to the US, even under Castelo Branco, there was some attempt at reduced alignment, as Washington was not prepared to help Brazil in its objective of national development. Geisel was the most successful in promoting a truly independent foreign policy. Figueiredo, who wanted to maintain the independent course, could not do so, due to financial, economic and political adverse circumstances.

Back to direct democracy in 1989, during the nineties, once more, Brazilian governments became more aligned to Washington. This started to change at the end of Cardoso’s second mandate, when it became clear that Brazil was not gaining anything by adhering to policies of the First World. The changes became significant under Lula, who was very adept at keeping good relations with the north, the Americans and the Europeans —Brazil becomes a strategic partner of the European Union in 2007— but positions Brazil as a country of the south and multiplies initiatives, mostly south-south, within the region, but also on other continents. Lula develops numerous and very diversified activities with African countries, but also with Asian countries, and across continents, such as the forum with India and South Africa. More recent is the BRIC cooperation, which developed from a concept into much more. In 2011, BRIC became BRICS, and, in 2014, a BRICS development bank was set up. This is a way to change the world order, and foster independent foreign policies. This is why Brazil should not be considered a middle power any more, but an emerged power (Burges 2013: 286-288, 292-209), or as Daudelin has called it: “Joining the Club: Lula and the End of Periphery for Brazil” (2008: 51-78).

It seems quite clear that Brazil’s national development thrives most under governments following nationalist policies, a Política Externa Independente, than under governments which prefer to align themselves to Washington. The US proved time and time again, that it was not interested in giving any support to Brazil, technological or otherwise, as quid pro quo. This was true under the military regime, during the Cold War, but also afterwards, after the end of the Cold War and the return to democracy. Therefore, under the military regime, Brazilian governments decided to go their own way with their partners, even communist ones if need be, which proved useful for the country’s national development. This happened on a broad scale over the world, from Germany for nuclear energy to the Soviet Union for technology transfer and the People’s Republic of China for the cooperation on the construction of satellites, while Af-
rica and the Middle East were and are important in other areas. Of course, the country had to take the international context into account, when it was developing its policies. But even so, Brazil became a global player. Geisel and Lula played a foremost role in this respect, especially the latter, because the democratic context was a big advantage.

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Marianne L. Wiesebron is Associate Professor of History at the Department of Latin American Studies at Leiden University. She specialises in Brazilian foreign relations and society. She also works on current economic and political developments in Latin America, in particular on problems of regional integration in South America. Amongst her recent works: “Social Policies during the Lula Administration: The Conditional Cash Transfer Program Bolsa Familia” (2014), Brazil under the Worker’s Party: Continuity and Change from Lula to Dilma (Co-Ed. 2014); “Democracia participativa e cidadania no Brasil” (2013).